by Michael Frede,8 have argued that Sextus only claims to suspend judgment about theoretical claims-e.g., the abstruse principles of Aristotelian nature philosophy-but that so far as ordinary or everyday claims are concerned, the skeptics believe with the masses. According to such interpreters, we are led into thinking that Sextus makes impossible claims only if we misinterpret him: Properly interpreted, he makes no such claims.
Surely, if Frede is right, Pyrrhonism is psychologically possible, for the scope of the skeptic's suspension would be quite local, and this very specificity would probably suffice to assure us o f its psychological possibility. In general, our assessments of the psychological possibility of skeptical suspension o f judgment tend to be largely a function of the scope o f that suspension, insofar as we tend to think specificity increases (and generality decreases) the likelihood of psychological possibility. But there is also an additional reason for thinking that Frede's version of Pyrrhonian epochê is psychologically possible, and that has to do with the actual content o f the claims at issue. It is just obvious (I think) that it is relatively easy to suspend judgment about abstruse theoretical claims of the sort Frede has in mind. So, a combination o f specificity and specific content makes a Frede-style suspension seem very plausible.
Fortunately or unfortunately, I m yself cannot believe that there is adequate evidence for the Frede interpretation in the extant texts, but for my purposes here I want to leave my dispute with Frede aside.9 I would instead rather consider what I take to have been the historically more influential inteipretation, which is currently championed by Myles Burnyeat.10 According to this latter interpretation, the skeptic claims to suspend judgment about all claims about how things are-both theoretical and everyday.11 On this interpretation, any claim about how things are, as opposed to how they merely seem to be, is a matter about which the skeptic would suspend judgment {PH 1. [19] [20] 22) . And, obviously, claims about how things are will include many perfectly ordinary claims, such as the perfectly ordinary claim that "The honey is sweet"-'Sure,' the skeptic will say, "it seems sweet" {PH 1. [19] [20] . It is this more radical interpretation of the scope of Pyrrhonian epoché that raises the question whether suspension o f belief on such a scale is even possible. I want to consider the question whether Pyrrhonism, thus construed, is psychologically possible.
Hume famously thought not. Hume agreed with Sextus that there are unanswerable skeptical arguments, but Hume found many of these very same arguments to be, quite literally, incredible-unbelievable. In a famous passage we are given what we might (somewhat playfully) call "Cleanthes' Criterion":
Whether your skepticism be as absolute and sincere as you pretend, we shall learn by and by, when the company breaks up; we shall then see whether you go out at the door or the window .... {Dialogues p.5)
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The implication here is as obvious as the rhetoric is delicious.
Sextus, however, seems to proceed as if the skeptical arguments can indeed move us, as if we can be led to believe the skeptical conclusion(s), and subsequently go our way adoxastös.
Here is how Sextus describes the path: The Pyrrhonian skeptic inquires, questions, etc. and is led to isostheneia (the equal balancing o f the considerations for and the considerations against some matter in question). Faced with this equal balancing o f considerations for and against, the matter seems undecidable; the matter's undecidability 2 then leads the skeptic to epoché (suspension o f judgment). Then, "as if by chance," (PH 1.29) he achieves ataraxia (tranquility, freedom from disturbance, peacefulness o f mind):
[A]s regards belief the Skeptic's goal is ataraxia, and . . . as regards things that are unavoidable it is having moderate patbê. For when the Skeptic set out to philosophize with the aim o f assessing his phantasia -that is, o f determining which are true and which are false so as to achieve ataraxiahe landed in a controversy between positions o f equal strength, and, being unable to resolve it, he suspended judgment. But while he was thus suspending judgment there followed by chance the sought-after ataraxia as regards belief. (PH 1.25-27, Mates translation) Now, if the arguments did not guide our cognitive life, then skeptical arguments would not be able to produce isostheneia (equal balancing), undecidability, or epoché (suspension o f judgment) and the skeptic would not fortuitously achieve ataraxia (tranquility). So, epoché, , the causal precondition of ataraxia, if it is to be achieved by arguments, requires that we can be moved by skeptical arguments. 13 Well, we may say, so much the worse for the Pyrrhonist's position. We know that skeptical arguments cannot move us; therefore, we know that the Pyrrhonist's position is indefensible. Q.E.D. That move-that antiskeptical response-is precisely the one I hope to cut off.
The Role of Pyrrhonian Epoche: Skepticism as a Eudaimonistic Ethic
Is it really possible that the human constitution has changed so much in two millennia that what was once possible for humans at the time of Sextus is no longer possible for us now? That seems quite unlikely to me. So either Pyrrhonism was possible then and is still possible now, or it was impossible then and it is still impossible now. If we take the latter approach (impossible then, impossible now), what shall we say o f Sextus (if we are using the Burnyeat interpretation)?
One thing we might say, which I am disinclined to take very seriously, is that Sextus was being disingenuous. (Here we have the 'liars or jesters' option.) The skeptics claimed to suspend all belief, the objection goes, but they knew that was impossible. Perhaps this was some sort o f grand philosophical joke on their part. Perhaps the ancient skeptics were just clever hooligans, drawn to the antiworkaday lifestyle o f philosophy-a band of Socratic hippies.
Unfortunately for such an interpretation, the extant sources and our knowledge o f how the other schools interacted with the skeptics make a spoof o f such immense proportions seem rather implausible. Really the only thing going for the hypothesis o f insincerity is the sheer, titillating appeal o f the proportions o f the deception-it would be like they fooled philosophical posterity itself, like learning o f an ancient tribe living hidden in a secret society right smack in the middle o f Central Park.
But if Sextus is not a liar or a mere jester, how do we account for his claims about the life o f a skeptic? That is, if we accept that the human constitution cannot have changed so much as to make what was possible for Sextus //«possible for us, how can we make sense o f Sextus? My own view is that the suspension of all belief that Sextus claims to be definitive of a true skeptic should be viewed as definitive of the skeptic's ethically ideal type.14 First, recall that skepticism was essentially a view o f the good life, a eudaimonistic account, in direct competition with other such accounts. Think for a moment of the claims made on behalf o f stoicism. Stoic writings tell us that the Sage is not worried over things beyond his control, that he controls his emotions and serenely accepts what must be, that he wishes things to be just exactly as they are, and so on. Now ask yourself, did any actual Stoic-or better yet, the bulk o f them-ever really live that way? Answer: Probably not. The "Sage" is an ideal character type for the Stoics, in very much the same way other ethical traditions have their own ideal types. To take another example, if one were to say "A Christian loves his neighbor and leaves judgment for God alone," one would not take this to mean that someone who failed to do so was not a Christian--or else there would be few, if any, Christians.15 Rather, a Christian is someone who subscribes to that ideal and aspires to reach it. What makes one a participant in this sort o f ethical tradition is your endorsing its ideal type and aspiring to it. The "Christian," like the "Sage," is an idealized character type. So, too, I believe that when Sextus refers to the "Skeptic" he has this sort of thing in mind. The Skeptic makes no determinations (PH 1.197), neither affirming nor denying anything (P H 1. [192] [193] , the Skeptic suspends all belief (PH 1 passim): That is, those who consider themselves skeptics (small "s") aspire to be like the character (quite possibly entirely or mostly fictional) to whom such sayings refer. Thus, although there were real skeptics, there might not have been a "Skeptic" in the ancient world at all.
As some initial confirmation o f this line o f thought consider what Sextus has to say about the skeptical "slogans" (phone),16 some of which were mentioned above in characterizing the "Skeptic." Sextus tells us that while these slogans may imply or suggest a form of dogmatism, they should not be taken as licensing any such implications or suggestions. Fie tells us, e.g., that the slogan "To every argument an equal argument is opposed" (PH 1.202 ff.) might be interpreted as "To every argument let us oppose an opposite argument!" That is, it ought to be read as an exhortation rather than as a declaration (PH 1.204-205). This allows the skeptic to deftly sidestep certain kinds of self-refutation charges o f the form: That slogan is a belief; therefore, you have a belief; therefore, you are refuted. My suggestion is that the utterance "The Skeptic has no beliefs"-which plays the same role, I think, as the slogans, viz. giving a characterization o f the "Skeptic"-should be read in the same spirit-not, that is, as a declaration, but as 1 Ί an exhortation: "Let us have no beliefs!" If so, certain kinds o f self-refutation arguments can be sidestepped, and, more importantly for present purposes, our eyes will be opened to the possibility that this otherwise very dubious declaration ("The Skeptic has no beliefs") is a call to action, not a victory speech. 18 But does that show that Pyrrhonism is psychologically possible? W ouldn't that be the same as arguing that Sextus didn 7 think skepticism was believable (i.e., there were skeptics, but no "Skeptics")? Well, not exactly. I think-consistently with what has been said so far-that Sextus in fact thought skepticism was believable, or, in other words, that he thought we really could achieve epochë. So what I need now is an account of how Sextus could have reasonably thought that.
I have three main, closely related reasons for thinking that Sextus did indeed accept the believability of skepticism (1, 2, & 3 below). The first is that (1) the Pyrrhonists do not appear to have ever developed what is now known as External World Skepticism. While the Pyrrhonists did claim to withhold belief about all non-evident matters falling under their consideration (PH 1.199, 200, (202) (203) , it does not appear that the existence o f a mind-independent world-or, more concretely, the mindindependent existence o f the earth or my body-ever fell under their consideration. We might put it this way: Pyrrhonian epochê is distributively universal, but collectively nonuniversal.19 They do claim to suspend beliefs about all non-evident matters fa llin g under their consideration, but (purely as a matter of fact) not all non-evident matters are matters that occurred to them or their dogmatic opponents. It seems that the Problem of the External World has a Modern (Cartesian) origin, and simply was not formulated at the time Sextus wrote. 20 This does not mean that Pyrrhonism was only attribute or property skepticism as opposed to existence skepticism. Nor does it mean that empirical beliefs o f the sort problematized by Cartesian skepticism were not ever subjected to Pyrrhonian critique (we have already seen examples o f just such empirical beliefs being critiqued). It just means that there was no general worry about all such cases taken together as regards their mind-independent existence. Now since I find suspension o f belief about the mind-independent existence o f the earth or my body more radical than suspension o f belief about the honey's sweetness {PH 1.20) or the tow er's true shape {PH 1.32, 118), I find Pyrrhonian epochs, , in one sense at least, less radical (and, hence, more plausibly believable) than External World Skepticism.
Thus, if in determining the psychological possibility o f (Sextus') Pyrrhonism you are trying to imagine suspending belief about the existence o f your body, you're considering the wrong sort o f case. And considering the wrong sorts of cases could lead us to foreclose on a live possibility.21
Still, even if Pyrrhonism is in some sense less radical than External World Skepticism, it seems just as global in scope-perhaps more so. Isn't this extraordinary scope itself sufficient to assure us that Pyrrhonism is not believable? I don't think so and here's why. Although both External World Skepticism and Pyrrhonism induce very wide-ranging doubts, they do so in entirely different ways. External World Skepticism hopes to traverse the gap between epistemic doubts and actual psychological suspension with a single argument (typically). In contrast, Pyrrhonism deploys particular arguments for each particular claim. (2) Where Descartes went, as he told us, right for the foundations, Sextus moves about piecemeal.23 Moreover, one employing the piecemeal approach is highly likely to be encouraged by past successful applications o f the method in particular cases: Every individual success would be seen as counting in favor o f the method. 24 Furthermore, (3) when the goal o f Pyrrhonism {ataraxia = tranquility) is borne in mind, it is very plausible to believe that skepticism could be a great success for me qua Pyrrhonist, even i f I had only fo u n d piecemeal and incomplete success with the method.
For these reasons, I believe the Pyrrhonists probably met with some success in approximating their ideal type. It seems likely that many Pyrrhonists succeeded in suspending belief about all sorts of particular matters while still falling short o f complete suspension. Moreover, insofar as Pyrrhonism was essentially a eudaimonistic account, the skeptic might have been able to achieve a fairly satisfactory state o f ataraxia, without completing his suspension o f all belief. Perhaps a general aloofness and noncommittal attitude, combined with the suspension of certain particularly problematic beliefs would be enough to leave the skeptic fairly well o ff-fairly tranquil, that is. In such a case, there is every reason to believe that such a skeptic would see his skepticism as a great success, and be more inclined to focus on his thus-far-achieved degree o f ataraxia than on 6 those matters he had not yet suspended belief over. Indeed, it is plausible to believe that the success he had met with would offer him encouragement that future successes might be in the offing.
Particularly Problematic Beliefs and A taraxia
In this penultimate section, I would like to amplify one of the reflections from the foregoing section, which I believe speaks rather directly to the plausibility o f my general interpretation o f Sextus. I have in mind the claim that certain particularly problematic beliefs might play a special role in coming to understand the skeptic's position. In particular, I think that reflecting on certain particularly problematic beliefs can shed light on the relation between epoché and ataraxia -i.e., on how or why ataraxia is found to follow epoché as a shadow follows a body. This is my proposal. The skeptic claims that, somehow, suspending judgmentliving adoxastös -produces tranquility {ataraxia). This claim can seem rather hard to understand, especially if we think paradigmatically of beliefs such as "The honey is sweet" or "The tower is round." But if we move to consider certain other beliefs, the claim gains considerable plausibility. Let me take three sorts of illustrative cases: (1) beliefs about death and the afterlife, (2) beliefs about religion more generally, and (3)
• 97 beliefs about ethics or, more generally, value theory.
Each o f (1-3) can easily be imagined to produce disturbance (taraché, the opposite o f ataraxia) or troubledness in a human life: Maybe I (or my wife, or mother, or best friend) will die and go to a place of torment, or maybe god (or the gods) will curse my existence, or maybe they already have, since poverty (laziness, sickness, etc.) is thought to be an evil and I am poor (lazy, sick, etc.). Were one to regard such possibilities as o f no more concern than whether the number o f stars is even or odd28-as a matter of no consequence at all, that is-it seems to me one's life might well be less troubled. Now although it is not true that Sextus consistently or explicitly privileges the importance of epoché concerning such matters as regards the attainment of ataraxia, our intuitive sense that such a connection is plausible can be supplemented by some brief, but revealing remarks from PH. In the courses o f the three books that comprise PH, there are only two passages where Sextus makes any attempt to try to explain why one might plausibly think ataraxia will follow epoché. Since the second of these two passages {PH 3.235-237) merely repeats the claims of the first {PH 1.27-30), it could reasonably be said that only one remark in the entire work (or only one twice-remarked remark) bears on the question. In that remark, Sextus tries to explain how the skeptic's eschewal of ethics (or, perhaps, value theory in general) will conduce to ataraxia:
[T]he person who believes that something is by nature good or bad is constantly upset; when he does not possess the things that seem to be good, he thinks he is being tormented by things that are by nature bad, and he chases after the things he supposes to be good; then, when he gets these, he falls into still more torments because of irrational and immoderate exultation, and, fearing any change, he does absolutely everything in order not to lose the things that seem to him good. But the person who takes no position as to what is by nature good or bad neither avoids nor pursues intensely. As a result, he achieves ataraxia. {PH 1.27-28, Mates translation) I repeat, it is in this passage, and this passage only (if we discount its repetition), that Sextus addresses the issue in PH ?9 Thus, our intuitive sense that such matters are more important, supplemented by P H 1.27-30 and 3.235-237, can be taken as at least plausible-if admittedly far from overwhelming-evidence that these matters are more "at issue" in the attainment o f ataraxia, and, therefore, more centrally connected to the success of Pyrrhonism (i.e. the success o f its search for ataraxia).
It is important to note that I am not proposing a scope restriction on epochë. I am not, that is, saying that the Pyrrhonian skeptic only sought to achieve epochë with respect to these particularly problematic beliefs. I still maintain that the skeptic seeks epochë about all non-evident matters falling under his consideration. But he seeks this epochë for a reason, viz. ataraxia as regards belief. Focusing on certain particularly problematic beliefs helps clarify why he might have thought ataraxia might follow epochë, and it also helps us see how his skepticism might well produce some measure o f ataraxia. Thus, such focus helps us understand how Sextus could have thought his approach was promising and offered hope o f ever greater, ever more complete success.
If these reflections are correct, then we have a way o f understanding Sextus' claims about the life o f a skeptic without limiting the scope of epochë or supposing Sextus to be liar/jester. Sextus was outlining a eudaimonistic account aimed at the attainment o f ataraxia. Since epochë has been found to result in ataraxia ("as if by chance"), the skeptic pursues epochë-that is, he pursues the ideal state o f being a "Skeptic." To be sure, he does not arrive at that ideal state, though he may well achieve or approximate ataraxia as regards belief during his pursuit of it.30
The Psychological Possibility of Pyrrhonism
So, what do I say to my guiding question? Is Pyrrhonism psychologically possible? Any straightforward, uncompromising response seems out o f place here, but this much is true: Pyrrhonism seems to me no less psychologically possible than many, many other ethical theories.31 To be sure, the Pyrrhonian ethically ideal state may not be-indeed, almost certainly is not-psychologically achievable. Thus, if we interpret the question o f Pyrrhonism's psychological possibility as equivalent to the question of the psychological possibility of complete Pyrrhonian epochë, then we must say Pyrrhonism is not psychologically possible. But I see no decisive reasons for so interpreting our guiding question. To note the unachievability o f the Pyrrhonian's ethically ideal state amounts to a very general criticism of any ethical view that is inherently aspirational. Any view, that is, which aims at a state o f self-realization (in the admirable Greek sense) that is not actually achievable. A philosopher's reach ought to exceed his grasp-or, at any rate, if it ought not do so, this is hardly a unique flaw in Pyrrhonism.
I think we ought to admit that the pursuit o f such an ideal state is indeed psychologically possible, and I think it is plausible to suppose that a Pyrrhonian might well achieve or approximate his true end, ataraxia, while thus pursuing, and incompletely exemplifying, epochë. So I see no good reason not to say that Pyrrhonism was, and arguably remains today,32 psychologically possible, though I concede that this is only so if we are willing to countenance partial success within an aspirational tradition as indicative of its success-as surely, I think, we should. If one allows a central role to aspiration in value theory, one might still strive to live the life adoxastös. Whether that is a life we ought to consider living is, I think, an important question, though not one I have addressed. But that living such a life, that striving for the ideals that give form to such a life, is possible-humanly possible-I think we must say it is.33
NOTES
1 The Pyrrhonian skeptic only claims to suspend judgment concerning matters that are nonevident. The interpretation of the term "non-evident" is, thus, related to the issue of scope addressed in the next section: All parties agree that the skeptic suspends judgment about nonevident matters; the dispute is over which matters are, according to the Pyrrhonian, "non- 2 In order to further clarify some of my common locutions we might consider (1) whether Pyrrhonism is believable, (2) whether Pyrrhonian suspension of judgment (epochè) is psychologically possible, (3) whether Pyrrhonian considerations can move us, or (4) whether Pyrrhonism (simpliciter) is psychologically possible. I will treat the question (1) whether Pyrrhonism is believable as (for present purposes) equivalent in meaning to (2) and argue that (3) bears on both (1) and (2). The core meaning of (1-3) concerns whether Pyrrhonism can be more than a mere intellectual curiosity, abstractly entertained: Can it have an effect on us? If so, how great an effect? As for (4)-my title question-I hope to use my reflections on (1-3) to position us to answer it. (4), I will argue, is not (or need not be taken to be) straightforwardly equivalent to (1) or (2), though it is closely related to (3). I owe my awareness of the need for this clarificatory note to Katheryn Doran and Derek Turner. doubts" in my sense about a set of religious practices I find to be simply incoherent. One might say instead that one has "epistemic worries" about such issues to avoid the appearance of comprehension that "doubt" normally implies-one must first conceive the issue(s), then be dubious. But "worries" sounds too weak to my ear, and "epistemic grounds for suspension of belief' sounds too wordy. On this issue, see Mates, The Skeptic Way, 30-32.
5 Enquiry, 160.
61 will assume the reader's familiarity with the basic shape of the position.
7 The Greek word epochë means 'suspension of judgment.' I will treat 'judgment' and 'belief as equivalent, and I will treat each as entailing a relatively stable attitude of 'taking-true' some proposition about how things are. Thus, in the language of my interpretative model, less-than-complete epochè is skepticism, and as such is less ideal than "Skepticism." Nonetheless, Barnes' emphasis on the importance of the epochè / ataraxia relation as a tool for interpreting Sextus is something I greatly admire in his paper. (3) Although I am not sure how much probative force we should judge Diogenes' account of Pyrrho to have-some parts of it seem very dubious, see note 12 above-Pyrrho is reported as having been very tranquil and yet as having once been "enraged in his sister's cause" and at another time "terrified" "when a cur rushed at him" (DL 9.66). Whether these would amount to non-skeptical slips or not is impossible to tell given the brevity of the reports, but Pyrrho is reported to have replied that it is "not easy entirely to strip oneself of human weakness; but one should strive with all one's might against facts, by deeds if possible, and if not, in word" (ibid.). If these really were non-skeptical slips and if the report of Pyrrho's reply can be accepted, this might offer some additional support for my aspirational account of Pyrrhonism: If Pyrrho himself, the eponymous forefather and patron saint of Pyrrhonism (of whom Sextus remarks that he appears to have "applied himself to Skepticism more vigorously and conspicuously than his predecessors" PH 1.7; see also DL 9.69-70), failed to achieve complete epochè, then perhaps the aspirational account can find further confirmation in the life of Pyrrho-"one should strive with all one's might ..." (DL 9.66, my emphasis) Again, though, I am not sure we can place much stock in Diogenes' account, so I leave these remarks for the reader to judge.
31 In addition to the ethical theories embedded in Stoicism and Christianity, as already mentioned, one might plausibly add some of paradigmatically existentialist ethical positions, esp. those of Kierkegaard and Nietzsche. For instance, if we went looking, how many Knights of Faith or Übermenschen should we expect to find? (If we say "none, if we are speaking strictly" does that constitute some sort of decisive objection to these authors?)
32 Since my primary aim has been to develop an adequate understanding of Sextus by sketching an aspirational account of Pyrrrhonism, I have concentrated mainly on the ancient situation, as it were. I think that my aspirational account of Pyrrhonism can be extended to cover the modern situation (one which includes Cartesian skepticism), though I cannot adequately defend such a claim here. (Every paper needs a promissory note.)
33 I would like to thank Katheryn Doran, Jose Medina, Tim Roche, Jeffrey Tlumak, and Derek Turner for comments on earlier drafts of this paper. I also wish to express my indebtedness to
